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L. and E.: Pleading and Practice--Splitting a Cause of Action on Injunction
RECENT CASE COMMENTS
ty into that state. But the mere acquisition of property, construction and operation of a plant, whether in carrying out a governmental or proprietary function, does not of itself interfere with
that sovereignty. It is suggested, therefore, that the court, in the
instant case, applies a better criterion.
F. P .C.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE

-

SPLITTING A CAUSE OF ACTION ON

INJUNCTION BoNDs.-The plaintiff sues on one of two injunction
bonds which were executed by the principal defendant with different sureties. In a prior suit the plaintiff recovered the full penalty
of one of the bonds, placing in issue all its items of damages, which.
greatly exceeded the penalty of the bond. The conditions of the
two bonds were identical and the same items of damages were
tendered in each suit. Held, that the plaintiff's recovery on one of
these bonds precludes his right to a judgment on the other, he having
litigated all his items of damagesin the prior action. State v. Covtinental Coal Co.'
These statutory 2 bonds were executed as a condition precedent
to the taking effect of a preliminary injunction 3 purporting to
save harmless the defendant enjoined, from any damages incurred
by reason of the injunction in case of its dissolution. 4 In the
absence of these bonds there is no common-law liability for such
damages unless the injunction was applied for maliciously or
without probable cause,' and it is suggested that the statute providing for the execution of sueh bonds does not create any extrinsic
liability. It would seem that in the absence of any such extrinsic
liability the defendant could be liable only upon the bonds, a
separate cause of action accruing on each by the breach of the
condition thereof.6 A person having several causes of action
1186 S. E 119 (W. Va. 1936).
2 W. VA. Rv. CODE (1931) c. 53, art. 5, § 9.
3 Conley v. Brewer, 85 W. Va. 725, 102 S. E. 607 (1920); Meyers v. Land
Co., 107 W. Va. 632, 149 S. E. 819 (1929).
4 See Meyers v. Land Co., 107 W. Va. 632, 643, 149 S. E. 819 (1929).
5 Glen Jean R. Co. v. Kanawha R. Co., 47 W. Va. 725, 35 S. E. 978 (1900);
Notes (1926) 45 A. L. R. 1517; L. R. A. 1916E, 1282; (1916) 14 R. C. L.
479. See State v. Marguerite Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 324, 326, 140 S. E. 49
(1927). In Gorton v. Brown, 27 Ill. 488 (1862) the court held where a bond
was required the remedy on the bond was exclusive even though the injunction
was obtained maliciously and without probable cause.
6 Courts have apparently assumed that the breach of the condition of a bond
gives rise to a cause of action. Roach v. Gardner, 9 Grat. 89 (Va. 1852);
Chicago R. Co. v. Cimarron, 68 Okla. 7, 170 Pae. 909 (1917); White v. Clay's
Ex'rs, 7 Leigh 68, 81 (Va. 1836); State v. Pingley, 84 W. Va. 433, 100 S. E.
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against another may maintain an action on any of such causes
without injuring his right to proceed upon any of the others.' The
fact that they may all be joined in one action," or that they arise
out of the same transaction, 9 is immaterial. Therefore it would
follow that the plaintiff should be allowed his separate actions
upon these bonds whether or not joinder is permissible under our
statute."0
The court applies this statute as if there were but one instrument in the case, basing this premise on the authority cited which
holds that these sureties on separate bonds are bound as co-sureties
1
the same as if on one instrument for the purpose of contribution.
Quaere: Does the fact that these sureties are bound as on one instrument for the purpose of contribution permit these two bonds to
be treated as one for the purpose of pleading? To further support its application of this statute the court cites the statutes of
several states as having provisions "more or less" similar to our
own and also cases purported to be decided under those statutes
permitting joinder in similar circumstances. However, the terms
of these statutes are somewhat broader than ours and would more
likely permit such joinder.12 It is therefore suggested that our
statute applying to "any instrument" cannot be so construed as
to apply.
216 (1919) ; Ballard v. Logan, 68 W. Va. 655, 70 S. E. 558 (1911) ; Gorton v.
489, 494, 81 Am. Dec. 245 (1862); Sewell v. Huffstetler, 83
Brown, 27 Ill.
Fla:. 629, 645, 93 So. 162 (1922).
7Robbins v. Harrison, 31 Ala. 160 (1857); Daneiger v. American Express
Co., 192 Mo. App. 106, 179 S.W. 806 (1915); Paton v. Doyne, 74 N. J. L.
319, 65 Atl. 843 (1907); Cook v. Conners, 215 N. Y. 175, 109 N. E. 78 (1915);
Ludwick v. Penny, 158 N. C. 104, 73.S. E.228 (1911); Rex v. Sheriff, 1 Barn.
& Adol. 672, 109 Eng. Rep. 936 (1831).
8 Olsen v. Whitney, 109 Fed. 80 (1901); Loughridge v. Morris, 68 Okla. 80,
171 Pac. 451 (1918).
9 Baumhoff v. St. Louis & K. Ry. Co., 205 Mo. 248, 104 S. W. 5 (1907);
Cannon v. Cox, 98 S.C. 185, 82 S.E. 399 (1914); International & G. N. Ry.
Co. v. Concrete Invest. Co., 201 S.W. 718 (Tex. Civ. App. 1917). See Naugle
v. Naugle, 89 Kan. 622, 132 Pac. 164 (1913).
'o W. VA.REV. CODE (1931) c. 55, art. 8, § 7.
". State v. Continental Coal Co., 186 S.E. 119, 121 (W. Va. 1936).
12 CAL. CODE CIvIL PROc. (Deering, 1923) § 383: "Persons severally liable
upon the same obligation or instrument .... and sureties on the same or
separate instruments, may all or any of them be included in the same action
at the option of the plaintiff.. ." KANs. REv. STAT. (Long, Smith & Farrelly,
1923) c. 60, art. 6: "The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the
same petition, whether they be such as have been heretofore denominated legal
or equitable, or both. But the causes of action so united must affect all the
parties to the action, except in actions to enforce mortgages or other liens."
NEB. ComP. STAT. (1922) § 8601: "Plaintiff may unite several causes of
action ... when they are included in either of the following classes: The same
transaction or transactions connected with same subject of action; contracts
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However upon the facts of this case its result is clearly justifiable. In suing separately upon two distinct causes of action the
judgment on the first operates as an estoppel only as to points and
questions actually litigated and determined. 13 It is believed that
since the plaintiff placed all its items of damages before the jury
where each was contested in the first action that they may be considered within the above rule, as points or questions litigated.
Therefore the plaintiff would be estopped to use them in this
second action.
1. E. L.
E. W. E.

AGENT - CREATION OF THE A GENCY RELATION.
PRiNcirAL m
Judgment was taken against C, constable, and S,accommodation
surety on C's constable bond. C's mother, M, paid the judgment
with money borrowed from S, giving her promissory note secured
by deed of trust. M brings suit against S on the theory that she is
equitable assignee of the judgment. S, in his answer, alleged that
when M paid the judgment it was with the intention "of paying
the same on behalf of her son, for the purpose of saving... [S] ...
blameless on account of his gratuitous undertaking." M demurred
to the answer. Demurrer overruled. On certificate before Supreme
Court of Appeals, ruling affirmed. Held, that where a judgment
-

express or implied . . ." § 8602: "The causes of action so united must
affect all the parties to the action, and not require different places of trial."
N. C. Code (1935) § 507. Same as above. OKLA. CouP. STAT. (Bunn, 1921)
§ 266. Same as above. OHio GEN. CODE (Page & Adams, 1910) §§ 11306,
suits
11307. Same as above. TEX. Coup. STAT. (1928) art. 1989. "In
brought by the state'... against any officer . . . or depository ... giving
more than one official bond, the sureties on each and all such bonds may ho
joined as defendants in the same suit whenever it is difficult to determine when
the default sued for occurred and which set of sureties on such bonds is liable
therefor."
These cases with the exception of Powell v. Powell, 48 Cal. 234 (1874),
and Siebern v. Meyer, 11 Ohio Dec. 344 (1886), permit such joinder without
reference to any statutory provisions whatsoever. Furthermore, none of these
cases involve injunction bonds. Two of the cases cited, Allen v. State, 61 Ind.
268, 28 Am. Rep. 673 (1878), and Lewis v. Gambs, 6 Mo. App. 338 (1878),
are not even in point, the former involving suit on only one bond and the latter
being a statutory proceeding for administration of an estate and not a suit
on the bonds.
13 (1917) 15 R. C. L. 450. See Hudson v. Iguano Land & Mining Co., 71 W.
Va. 402, 408, 76 S. R. 797 (1912); Pomeroy National Bank v. Huntington
National Bank, 72 W. Va. 534, 537, 79 S.E. 662 (1913); Cromwell v. County of
Sac, 94 U. S. 351, 353, 24 L. Ed. 195 (1876); Southern Pac. R. Co. v. United
Stdtes, 168 U. S. 1, 48, 42 L. Ed. 355 (1897).
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